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Abstract 
This paper develops an empirical framework to analyze consumer’s dynamic switching decision 
in the cellular service industry. It first incorporates the sequential problem of quantity, plan and 
firm subscription choice in the presence of switching costs into a dynamic structural model, 
which allows for fully heterogeneous consumers and multiple switching possibilities across 
networks. The model is estimated using the data set on the number of switching consumers and 
the evolution of observed plan/firm characteristics over time. Based on the BLP-style estimation 
methods, we combine a nested technique that uses parametric assumptions with the structural 
estimation algorithm. The magnitude of switching costs is estimated and it turns out that 
switching costs vary across networks. A dynamic model with restricted number of switching is 
likely to underestimate the switching costs. Lower switching costs encourage consumers to 
switch relatively early. Change in the variety of optional plans and plan characteristics also play 
a great role in the consumers’ switching decision.  
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1. Introduction 
    As the telecommunication technology has been developing, the size of the network1 
industry has been increasing. Network service providers usually offer multiple tariffs 
competing in the menu of plans as well as the quality of service. The price schedule is 
non-linear in quantity. In the cellular phone service market, especially, firms provide 
optional calling plans with diverse combinations of both calling rate and non-price plan 
specifics. Such a pricing scheme aims to attract more subscribers and exploit the 
heterogeneity in consumer preferences. If multiple nonlinear tariffs require subscription 
before starting to use services, changing subscription status can generate switching costs 
for consumers. Consumer decision consists of two steps, which are a firm/plan choice 
and a usage choice. In the first step, the existing customer has three options at each 
period while using a cellular service: to stay with the current provider, to switch to 
another plan within the same provider, and to switch to a different provider. Then in the 
second step, the existing customer subsequently makes a usage decision conditional on 
the chosen plan. 
    When consumers decide whether to switch their service provider or not, they will try 
to figure out which provider offers the best matching plan for them. The best match 
would vary across heterogeneous consumers. Therefore tariff variety can be a crucial 
pricing strategy for firms. More variety is able to attract consumers from competitors as 
well as to retain its own customers by increasing the possibility of offering better 
matching options. The switching costs can also affect consumer’s switching decision 
and firm strategies2. Consumers will decide to switch if the potential savings from 
switching exceed its costs. High switching costs prevent consumers from choosing a 
different network even though they would realize that there exists a plan with a better 
match which was either not chosen or not available previously. Note that the existence 
of switching costs makes the subscription demand of the consumer a dynamic problem.  
    Understanding the consumer switching behavior in the network industry has 
important implications for the service providers as well as the policy makers. First, the 
                                                
1 Network is composed of complementary nodes and links. A service delivered over a network requires 
the use of two or more network components. 
2
 Klemperer (1987), Farrell and Shapiro (1988), Beggs and Klemperer (1992)  
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cellular service industry has imposed switching costs on consumers, a unique 
characteristic of the network industry. They have been considered as anticompetitive 
elements of the market by generating lock-in effect. Policy makers have tried to reduce 
the switching costs to encourage market competition. This paper allows us to examine 
the role of switching costs in the consumer dynamics. Second, as the cellular phone 
service market has grown rapidly and the penetration rate has increased, the number of 
new subscribers cannot help shrinking. In the mature market with a shrinking base of 
potential subscribers, stealing competitors' customers and retaining its own subscribers 
becomes one of the most important marketing strategies for the firms. Therefore, firms 
get more interested in understanding what factors the consumer's switching decisions 
depend on. 
    This paper develops an empirical framework examining the demand for the network 
good with multiple non-linear pricing schemes. It constructs the model of the rational 
forward-looking consumer's switching decision. Firms provide differentiated network 
services, requiring subscription first over the temporal horizon. We incorporate the 
consumer's sequential choice problem into the dynamics. Consumers are fully 
heterogeneous and are allowed to repeat switching over time. Therefore, our model and 
estimation methods are applicable to other network industries such as wire phone 
service, internet service, cable TV service and etc. The dynamic structural model allows 
us to investigate important questions about the source of switching behavior. 
    The main estimation methods are based on the BLP. The analysis is in the framework 
of a discrete choice model with random idiosyncratic variations. Fixed point calculation 
is used to compute the predicted switching rate. Then distributional assumption on the 
relation between unobserved firm attributes and instruments allows us to construct a 
GMM estimator. While in the context of the BLP, however, we take some different 
approach for estimating the dynamic optimization process. We impose the parametric 
assumptions on a distribution of future products and endogenous switching probability, 
and then obtain related parameters in the structural estimation algorithm. We assume 
rational expectation which implies that consumer expectations match the actual 
realization of the future products distribution. And estimated reduced-form parameters 
of switching probability would be consistent with the dynamic optimization problems. 
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    The rest of the paper is as follows. The next section contains literature reviews. 
Section 3 discusses the model. Two subsections of Section 3 will contain the model 
which allows multiple switching possibilities and the model which restricts the number 
of switching respectively. Section 4 presents estimation methods. Data are described in 
Section 5. Section 6 provides the empirical results and finally Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
    Some empirical papers have studied the discrete choice model for the demand in the 
telecommunication industry. Train, McFadden, and Beb-Akiba (1987) estimate a nested 
logit model where plan choice and quantity choice are made simultaneously. Miravete 
(2002) develops a model which accounts for sequential characteristics of plan choice 
and quantity choice. He shows that the monopoly screens consumers with multiple 
optional calling plans. Utility specification for calling quantity in this model follows 
that of this paper. Narayanan, Chintagunta and Miravete (2005) analyze the demand for 
monopolistic local telephone service using micro-level data in the same context as 
Miravete (2002). Similarly, Iyengar (2004) studies the demand for wireless service by 
constructing a structural model incorporating sequential decisions of plan and quantity 
choice. Since consumer choices are limited to plan and volume decision within one firm 
in these studies, the demand for firm specific subscription has not been considered. 
Even though Iyengar (2004) considers the disconnecting rate in his paper, most papers 
ignore the consumer's switching decision, focusing instead on the plan and usage choice. 
Economides (2006) uses panel data at the subscriber-level to investigate the consumer 
decision for quantity choice and subscription choice over time. Economides, Seim and 
Viard (2005) develop a model that explains the consumer's switching decision for an 
internet service provider using a panel data set. 
    The dynamic structure and estimation methods in this paper are closely related to a 
group of recent empirical literature that studies the consumer demand for durable goods. 
Melnikov (2001) develops a model which analyzes the dynamics of consumer demand 
for a differentiated durable product, a computer printer market. The optimal timing of 
 5 
consumers' purchases is formalized for the homogeneous consumers using a logit utility 
specification. Carranza (2004) allows for heterogeneous consumers in studying the 
dynamic demand for the digital camera market. They incorporate the endogeneity of 
price in their models, but restrict purchase to at most one time. Gordon (2006) analyzes 
the homogenous consumers' demand for computer processors, allowing for repeated 
purchases. Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2006) specify and estimate a dynamic model of 
demand for DVD players. They consider fully heterogeneous consumers, and also allow 
them to purchase the durable good multiple times. Carranza (2005) and Gowrisankaran 
and Rysman (2006) take the estimation approach that part of the dynamic choice 
problem is approximated parametrically. The former adopts a logit approximation for 
the endogenous participation probability, and the latter specifies a linear assumption on 
the distribution of future product quality. Besides these two papers, the estimation 
method of our model is based on Berry (1994) and BLP (1995) which develop the 
heterogeneous consumers' discrete choice model under the endogeneity of price and 
Rust (1987) where the optimal stopping decision is analyzed. 
    In terms of switching costs, empirical estimation and impact evaluation of switching 
costs have been explored in various industries. Carlsson and Lofgren (2004) estimate 
the switching costs of domestic flight routes in Sweden's airline industry. Chen and Hitt 
(2002) develop and implement an approach for measuring switching costs and brand 
loyalty for online service providers. They conclude that online brokerage firms have 
significant control over their switching costs through product and service design. None 
of them is derived from a dynamic model. Therefore the magnitude of switching costs 
has the possibility of overestimation or underestimation. 
 
 
3. Model 
3.1 Model with repeated switching 
    Consumers have fully heterogeneous preferences. We consider the existing 
consumers of operating providers, who have already subscribed to one of the cellular 
service firms and have been using the cellular service. Each firm announces a menu of 
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calling plans in the beginning of the month3. Denote M as the number of firms in the 
market. Existing consumers have three options. They can renew contract with their 
current provider, or choose different provider given updated information on available 
calling plans. And they can also quit using the cellular service phone and leave the 
market by choosing the outside option. Firms and consumers have infinite horizons and 
a common discount factor β .  
    In the presence of multiple nonlinear tariffs, an optimization problem of the consumer 
who stays in the market consists of three steps. First, a consumer decides whether to 
quit using the cellular service. Second conditional on staying in the market, she chooses 
the best matching plan which maximizes her discounted value of future expected utility 
among available plans provided by all the firms, conditional on her information at time t . 
If she keeps the plan of the previous period or changes the plan within her initial 
provider, switching costs are supposed to be zero since she stays with the initial service 
provider. We assume that switching costs do not occur as long as a consumer remains in 
the same firm. If she chooses a different service provider, she has to suffer the switching 
costs. Then she has to make a usage decision, conditional on the chosen plan in the first 
step. Random usage shock itv  occurs to every consumer at this moment
4
. Given the 
shock, she decides the optimal quantity of calling minutes and subsequently the total 
amount to be paid is determined. Note that a consumer cannot predict the exact 
realization of her usage in the stage of plan choice because usage shock would not be 
realized until the plan choice is made. 
    Calling option mj  of firm m  at time t  is characterized by observed plan-specific 
characteristics
mj tx , free monthly allowance mj tA , per-minute calling rate mj tp , monthly fee mj ta , 
and unobserved firm characteristics mtξ . Total amount of payment for i , mij tT can be written as 
( ) { }max ,0
m m m m m mij t ij t j t j t ij t j tT q A p q a= + − , where mij tq represents the  quantity of calling 
minutes of consumer i  for plan mj . Observed plan-specific characteristics include the number 
of available text messages, the number of discounted lines, the possibility of forwarding 
                                                
3
 Consumers can obtain information on the pricing schemes, customer benefits and other related new 
through the firm webpage, advertisement or visit to the local agency.  
4
 Random usage shock captures the unexpected factors or situations which can affect individual’s 
consumption behavior. It is time-specific and is supposed to last no longer than a month. For example, 
sudden illness or business trip are likely to change consumer’s normal usage pattern. 
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remained allowance, and the additional non-call related service options such as caller ID. Note 
that 
mj tx  and mtξ  can be different over periods since the firm can change the plan options and 
unobserved firm attributes can vary over time. Let imc  denote the switching costs that occur 
when consumer i  switches from m to a different service provider. Switching costs of each firm 
{ } 1,...,im m Mc = are assumed to be constant across periods.  
    The static utility that consumer i  obtains from using q  minutes under rate plan mj  of 
firm m  at time t  is specified by 
  ( )
( )
log
:
m
m m m m m
m m m m
ij t
it ij t ij t i j t mt i ij t ij t
ij t it i ij t i j t mt ij t
u
v q q x T
u q v T x
γ ξ α ε
α γ ξ ε
= + + + − +
= − + + +
 
where
mij tε  is an idiosyncratic preference shock of the plan mj  which captures random 
variations and is independent across each other, consumers, plans and time. It is 
assumed to follow the extreme value distribution. The static net utility depends on the 
calling quantity
mij tq , the consumer's heterogeneity iα and iγ , and unobserved firm 
attributes mtξ . In particular, the first part of the static utility function that contains 
calling volume q follows that of Miravete (2002). This specific functional form helps 
the optimization problem of the calling quantity to be solved more easily. iα  and iγ  are 
the random coefficients that weights the total payment and plan-specific characteristics, 
and do not vary across time for a given consumer. Let iθ denote a group of parameters, 
{ }( ), ,i i im m Mcα γ ∈ . ,i iα γ  is assumed to be distributed normally with mean ,α γ  and 
imc follows a left-truncated normal distribution over a range of 0imc > . The variance 
matrix Σ will be estimated in the model. Finally, subscribed consumers can stop using 
the service any time and choose to take an outside option such as a wire telephone 
service or an internet phone service. We normalize the flow utility from those outside 
options to zero. 
    We solve the consumer's sequential decision process by backward induction. First, 
consider how each consumer makes the volume decision conditional on plan choice mj . 
The usage choices satisfy the following maximization problem. 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ), , arg max :
m m m m m mij t i i it ij t it i ij t ij t i j t mt ij t
q
q v u q v T q xα γ α γ ξ ε= − + + +  
    The total payment is a non-linear function and has kinks when the actual calling 
quantity equals the monthly free allowance. The demand function with usage shock itv  
is given by 
 ( )
( )
( )
exp log
log log
exp log
m m m
m m m m
m
it i j t it j t i j t
ij t it j t j t it i j t
it it j t
v p v A pif
q v A if A v p
ifv v A
α α
α
− > +
= < <
<
 
  Note that the optimal calling quantity depends on iα  which varies across consumers. 
The variation in consumer tastes generates a differentiated marginal utility, which 
results in different optimal usage choice. Since usage shock itv  is unknown to 
consumers before the actual plan choice is made, they have uncertainty in their usage 
level prior to the plan choice. Therefore consumers have to compare the expected utility 
of each plan for the plan/switching decision. Assuming itv  follows the normal 
distribution ( )20,N v , we can obtain the closed form of the expected utility for each 
plan. 
 
m m m
e
v ij t ij t ij tE u u ε  = +   
m
e
ij tu denotes the part of the expected utility from plan mj  of firm m  at time t  which 
does not account for potential switching costs and idiosyncratic variations. We make 
two important assumptions on switching costs. First, we assume that switching costs 
occur only once at the period of switching. Second, they are supposed to depend on 
which firm consumers switch from, not switch to 5 . Switching costs in the 
telecommunication industries mainly consist of compatibility costs, transaction costs 
and search costs. Compatibility costs occur when the network operator forces its 
subscribers to use the exclusive handsets. Transaction costs are associated with 
changing the phone numbers, visiting the store to cut off the service or paying the 
termination fee. And search costs are the costs which consumers have to bear for 
                                                
5
 The model can be extended to have different switching costs across the firms which consumers switch to.  
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collecting information about the services of other network providers6. Most of costs are 
likely to occur near the time of switching and to depend on the initially subscribed firm. 
The second assumption might not capture the compatibility costs which depend on the 
firm consumers switch to. However, the compatibility of handsets between networks 
has kept decreasing recently. 
    Now consider the dynamic decision that each consumer faces every month. Note that 
whichever service provider a consumer was subscribing to, she would choose the best 
matching plan offered by the firm. Let tΩ  be the market characteristics at time t  
including current plan characteristics, firm attributes and other market environments. 
We assume the Markov chain ( )1 |t tP +Ω Ω where the evolution of 1t+Ω  depends only on 
the current state tΩ . In this model, consumers are allowed to switch providers every 
period if they want. Even though a consumer signed a long-term contract in the past, she 
can close the contract only by paying high termination fee in reality. Suppose consumer 
i has subscribed to firm m  at period 1t − . At period t  she can either stay with m  or 
switch to any different service provider ( )k m≠ . The Bellman equation is defined as 
 ( )
( )( )
( )( )
1 1 1
1 1 1
max , | ,
, max max , | ,
0
m m
m
k k
k
e
ij t ij t imt it t tj m
e
imt it t ij t im ij t ikt it t tj k
u E V
V u c E V
ε β ε
ε ε β ε
+ + +
∈
+ + +
∈
  + + Ω Ω  
 
 Ω = − + + Ω Ω  
 
 
 
 (1.1) 
for firm k M m∈ − . itε  is a vector of idiosyncratic shocks across all the firms in the 
market. Note that the maximum attainable utility from switching contains the term for 
switching costs. We assume that consumers observe realized values of the current 
idiosyncratic shockε  but know only its distribution for the future value. Given the i.i.d. 
assumption on the distribution ofε , the expectation of the value function at any period 
tτ >  can be integrated as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ),im im iEV V dfτ τ τ τ τε ε εΩ = Ω∫  
    Consumer i 's Bellman equation depends on which firm she subscribed to at the 
previous period, since where consumers depart from would determine the magnitude of 
                                                
6
 Klemperer (1995) 
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the switching costs which is the source of the dynamic feature in the decision process. 
From (1), the consumer can choose to hold off switching and keep her current service 
provider, or to switch to one of the available plans provided by different firms. Bellman 
equation of this model has a difference with that of other literatures studying the 
dynamic consumption behavior for common durable goods. Unlike the one-shot 
purchase of general durable goods industry, cellular service firms provide multiple tariff 
options for their subscribers. Given any firm, consumers will choose the plan which 
maximizes their expected utility among all the plans offered by the firm (second 
maximization problem). And eventually they will pick the firm which offers the plan 
which generates the highest maximum attainable utility (first maximization problem) as 
long as it outweighs the outside option. The Bellman equation above captures these two 
maximization problems. 
    Now we consider a dynamic decision of consumers. Consumer i  would choose to 
switch from firm m  to any firm ( )k m≠ only if 
 
( )( )
( )( )
1 1
1 1
max |
max |
k k
k
m m
m
e
ij t imt ij t ikt t tj k
e
ij t ij t imt t tj m
u c E EV
u E EV
ε β
ε β
+ +
∈
+ +
∈
 − + + Ω Ω 
 > + + Ω Ω 
 (1.2) 
and  
 ( )( )1 1max | 0k k
k
e
ij t imt ij t ikt t tj k
u c E EVε β + +
∈
 − + + Ω Ω >   
 
Let imth denote the probability that consumer i  chooses to switch from m  to any firm. 
 
( )( )
( )( ){ }
1 1
1 1
max |
Pr
max max | ,0
k k
k
m m
m
e
ij t imt ij t ikt t tj k
imt
e
ij t ij t imt t tj m
u c E EV
h
u E EV
ε β
ε β
+ +
∈
+ +
∈
  − + + Ω Ω  
=  
 > + + Ω Ω   
 (1.3) 
 
for all k M m∈ − . Let 
 ( )( )1 1max |m m
m
e
imt ij t ij t imt t tj m
u E EVϕ ε β + +
∈
 = + + Ω Ω   
be the part of the maximum expected utility obtained from firm m M∈ at time t  
without switching costs c where { }it imt m Mϕ ϕ ∈= , and let  
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 ( )1 1 |m meij t ij t imt t tu E EVδ β + + = + Ω Ω   
be the part of the expected utility obtained from specific plan mj which excludes the 
current idiosyncratic shock ε . Given the distributional assumption onε , we can prove 
that imtϕ  is distributed the extreme value with mode imtδ (Appendix A): 
 ( )ln exp
m
m
imt ij t
j m
δ δ
∈
 
=   
 
∑  (1.4) 
    The logit value represents the expected discounted utility from subscribing to the 
specific service provider at each period except for the utility decrease due to switching 
costs. Since the logit inclusive value imtδ is a sufficient statistic for the distribution of imtϕ , 
the switching participation rate imth can be written as a function of the logit inclusive 
values and switching costs (Appendix B). 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), ln expimt t imt imt t ikt t im t
k M m
h h cδ δ
∈ −
 Ω = Ω Ω − Ω 
 
∑  (1.5) 
    Now consider the probability that consumer i of firm m chooses the outside option. 
For all k M m∈ − , the quitting probability is given by   
 
( )( )
( )( )
[ ]
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1
1 1
max | 0,
Pr
max | 0
Pr 0, 0
0 0
, ln exp
m m
m
k k
k
imt iM mt
e
ij t ij t imt t tj mq
imt
e
ij t im ij t ikt t tj k
imt iM mt
q
imt imt t ikt t im t
k M m
u E EV
h
and u c E EV
F F
h c
ϕ φ
ε β
ε β
ϕ φ
δ δ
−
+ +
∈
+ +
∈
−
∈ −
  + + Ω Ω <  
=  
 − + + Ω Ω <   
= < <
= ⋅
 
= Ω Ω − Ω 
 
∑
 
where the cumulative distributions of imtϕ and iM mtφ − , imtFϕ and itFφ are shown in the 
appendix A and B respectively. 
   Now in order to solve the dynamic optimization problem of consumers, we need to 
know consumer i 's expectations about the future utility from using the service and the 
switching costs which are likely to be affected by the evolution of future market 
characteristics. Because of the large potential dimensionality of Ω , it is hard to solve (2) 
directly. So we make assumptions on the process of market evolution over time. First, 
the evolution of the logit inclusive values is assumed to be Marcovian as in Hendel and 
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Nevo(2003) and Gowrisankaran and Rysman(2006) . Specifically, the expected logit 
inclusive value at time 1t +  depends only on the logit inclusive values at time t 7. Then 
the Marcov process of 1imtδ + , ( )1 |imt itP δ δ+ is assumed to be  
 ( ) ( )1 1 2 3| ln expimt it m m imt m ikt im imt
k M m
P cδ δ pi pi δ pi δ µ+
∈ −
= + + − +∑  (1.6) 
where { }it ikt k Mδ δ ∈=  and imtµ follows the normal distribution of mean zero and variance 
2
µσ . Note that we allow interaction between the firms in determining the future logit 
inclusive values. It would be more reasonable than when 1imtδ +  is a function of only imtδ  
since a firm's strategy is likely to be affected by its competitors' action and the inclusive 
value captures the realization of such strategies. We also allow the parameters of the 
product evolution to vary across firms. Overall, this assumption benefits the estimation 
by reducing the dimensionality of the state space for the expectation of the value 
function.  
    Now we can rewrite the expected value function, switching participation probability 
from m , and quitting probability from m  as 
 ( )
( )( )
( )( )
1
1
max ,
, max
max
k k
k
m m
m
e
ij t im ij t ikt itj k M m
imt it it
e
ij t ij t imt itj m
u c E EV
V
u E EV
ε β δ
ε δ
ε β δ
+
∈ ∈ −
+
∈
  − + +   
=  
 + +   
 (1.7) 
 
( )
( )
, ln exp
, ln exp
imt imt imt ikt im
k M m
q q
imt imt imt ikt im
k M m
h h c
h h c
δ δ
δ δ
∈ −
∈ −
 
= − 
 
 
= − 
 
∑
∑
 (1.8) 
respectively for k M m∈ − . Then the probability that consumer i  who has subscribed to 
m  at time 1t −  switches to a specific provider n  at time t  consists of two components; 
first, the probability that she decides to change her initial provider m to any other 
provider; and second, the probability that she chooses a specific firm n  over the other 
operating firms in the market. The former is given by (8). The latter, the probability that 
                                                
7
 Since we deal with the inclusive values imtδ not individual mij tδ , high inclusive value can indicate both 
two cases, which are 1) firm m is offering the large number of optional plans with relatively high prices 
2) firm m is offering the small number of optional plans with relatively low prices. 
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n  offers the highest maximum attainable utility among the firms conditional on 
deciding to switch is defined as: 
 
 
( )
( )
exp
exp
int im
im nt
ikt im
k M m
c
h
c
δ
δ→
∈ −
−
=
−∑
 
    Therefore consumer i 's firm specific switching probability from m  to n , im nts →  can 
be written as (9).  
 ( ) ( )( )
exp
, ln exp
exp
int im
im nt imt imt ikt im
k M m ikt im
k M m
c
s h c
c
δδ δ δ→ ∈ −
∈ −
− 
= − 
− 
∑
∑
 (1.9) 
    Now we can calculate the predicted switching rate between firms for at any period t . 
Since the static utility function contains random coefficients across heterogeneous 
consumers, we need to integrate (9) over the joint distribution of random coefficients iθ  
to obtain the aggregated predicted switching rates. And finally, we need to specify the 
distributional assumptions on the joint distribution of the unobservable firm attributes 
and instrument variables which will be mentioned later. Those assumptions will allow 
us to identify the parameters of the model. As in standard BLP literatures, unobserved 
firm characteristics mtξ  at each period are assumed to be orthogonal to the firm specific 
attributes. Let ( )f θ  denote the joint density function of the random coefficients of the 
utility function. Then the aggregated switching rate and quitting rate can be obtained as 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
exp
, , , , ln exp
exp
, , , , ln exp
int im
m nt mt imt ikt im
k M m ikt im
k M m
q q
mt imt imt ikt im
k M m
c
s h c df
c
h h c df
δξ θ β δ δ θδ
ξ θ β δ δ θ
→
∈ −
∈ −
∈ −
− Σ = − 
− 
 Σ = − 
 
∑∫ ∑
∑∫
(1.10) 
 
 
3.2 Model with restricted switching 
    In this subsection, we consider the restricted model where consumers switch their 
service providers only once. Most of the discussion is similar with the earlier section 
where repeated switching is allowed. However, the value function (7) would be 
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different since the consumers have restricted options after switching. Once they 
experience switching to a new service provider, consumers can change plans only 
within the same firm. The Bellman equation for consumer i  who has switched to firm 
m  at time tτ <  is defined as  
 ( ) ( )( )1 1, max | ,0m m
m
e
imt it t ij t ij t imt t tj m
B u E EBε ε β + +
∈
 Ω = + + Ω Ω   (1.11) 
 
    And for consumer i who subscribed to m initially and has never experienced 
switching her provider until time t , the Bellman equation is given by 
 ( )
( )( )
( )( )
1 1
1 1
max | ,
, max max | ,
0
k k
k
m m
m
e
ij t im ij t ikt t tj k
b e b
imt it t ij t ij t imt t tj m
u c E EB
V u E EV
ε β
ε ε β
+ +
∈
+ +
∈
  − + + Ω Ω  
 
 Ω = + + Ω Ω  
 
 
 
 (1.12) 
 
for k M m∈ − . Let  
 
( )( )
( )( )
1 1
1 1
max |
max |
m m
m
m m
m
b e
imt ij t ij t imt t tj m
v e b
imt ij t ij t imt t tj m
u E EB
u E EV
ϕ ε β
ϕ ε β
+ +
∈
+ +
∈
 = + + Ω Ω 
 = + + Ω Ω 
 
be the part of the maximum attainable utility obtained from m  when consumer i  
already switched to m at tτ <  and when she has never switched since the first period 
respectively. And denote the part of the expected utility from specific plan mj that is not 
due to idiosyncratic shock as  
 
( )
( )
1 1
1 1
|
|
m m
m m
b e
ij t ij t imt t t
v e b
ij t ij t imt t t
u E EB
u E EV
δ β
δ β
+ +
+ +
 = + Ω Ω 
 = + Ω Ω 
 
Given the logit distribution ofε , we can show that bimtϕ and vimtϕ are distributed extreme 
value with modes (13) respectively. 
 
( )
( )
ln exp
ln exp
m
m
m
m
b b
imt ij t
j m
v v
imt ij t
j m
δ δ
δ δ
∈
∈
 
=   
 
 
=   
 
∑
∑
 (1.13) 
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    As in the earlier section, we assume that the Marcov process of firm evolution 
follows a linear specification for the logit inclusive values. In order to solve the 
dynamic optimization problem, the future evolution of the logit inclusive values is 
required. We have a new form of inclusive values for a consumer who has experienced 
switching. In particular, we have two sets of logit inclusive values for each firm, which 
are for consumers who have already switched and for those who have never switched. 
We define similar specifications for the expectation of future inclusive values with a 
different set of parameters ( )1 2 3, ,b b b bm m m mpi pi pi pi= and ( )1 2 3, ,v v v vm m m mpi pi pi pi= for any m with 
an i.i.d. drift ( )20,imt N µµ σ∼ . We assume that the logit inclusive values would be 
affected by interaction with the other competitors' inclusive values. We specify Marcov 
process as 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 2 3
1 1 2 3
| ln exp
| ln exp
b b b b b b b b
imt it m m imt m ikt imt
k M m
v v v v v v v v
imt it m m imt m ikt imt
k M m
P
P
δ δ pi pi δ pi δ µ
δ δ pi pi δ pi δ µ
+
∈ −
+
∈ −
= + + +
= + + +
∑
∑
 (1.14) 
                                                           
 Then (1.12) can be written as  
 ( )
( )( )
( )( )
1
1
max ,
, , max max ,
0
k k
k
m m
m
e b
ij t imt ij t ikt itj k
b b v e b v
imt it it it ij t ij t imt itj m
u c E EB
V u E EV
ε β δ
ε δ δ ε β δ
+
∈
+
∈
  
− + +   
   = + +  
 
 
  
 (1.15) 
 
    Now consider how to obtain the predicted switching rate. Note that consumers who 
have experienced switching at time tτ <  cannot contribute to the switching rate since 
we restrict multiple switching in this subsection. The probability that consumer i  of 
firm m  decides to switch at time t consists of two parts: the probability that she decides 
to switch from m to any other firm, and the probability that she chooses a specific firm 
n  conditional on deciding to switch. They are defined as  
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    We can also obtain the function of quitting probability. For a consumer to choose the 
outside option, the maximum attainable utility from subscribing to any firm must be 
smaller than zero. 
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Because the predicted switching probability can be applied only to the consumers who 
have never switched their service providers, the firm specific switching probability is 
derived from the Bellman equation (15). Therefore, bimth  depends on its own inclusive 
value vimtδ  which  includes the full option value from possible future switching and its 
competitors’ inclusive values biktδ for k M m∈ −  which contains the restricted option 
value from no future switching. Following the same step as in the earlier section, the 
probability that consumer i  who subscribed to m  at time 1t −  decides to switch from 
m  to n  is  
 ( ) ( )( )
exp
, ln exp
exp
b
int imb b v b
im nt imt imt ikt im b
k M m ikt im
k M m
c
s h c
c
δ
δ δ
δ→ ∈ −
∈ −
− 
= − 
− 
∑
∑
 (1.16) 
Then we can obtain the predicted aggregate switching rates and quitting rates by 
integrating (16) over the joint density distribution ofθ . 
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 (1.17) 
Since the consumers who have experienced switching are assumed not to switch 
repeatedly, the ratio of potential switchers is included in the aggregate switching rates.  
 
( )1 1 1 11 q Nmt mt mt mt
mt
mt
h h
Q
− − − −
Π − − + Π
Γ =  
for 1t > and 1 1mΓ =  where ( )1 1 1 11 q Nmt mt mt mt mth h− − − −Π = Π − − + Π  for 1t >  and 1 1m mQΠ = . 
mtQ is the number of total subscribers at the beginning of period t . Finally, NmtΠ denotes the 
number of total subscribers and the number of new subscribers for firm m during period t .  
.  
 
4. Estimation 
    Estimation of the model is based on the BLP technique. First, the fixed point 
algorithm allows us to compute the vector of the mean implied utilities with which 
predicted and observed aggregate switching rates become identical. Then next, the 
preference parameters and reduced-form parameters of the switching participation can 
be estimated by interacting the vector of unobserved firm attributes with instruments. 
The distributional assumption on orthogonality between ξ  and instrument variables z  
is required. Finally, the transition matrix which is based on the linear regression (6) can 
be obtained by computing the dynamic programming problem conditional on a ξ vector 
and parameters for every simulated consumer. 
    Estimated parameters ( ),θ Σ include the mean switching costs across firms, the mean 
consumer tastes for the price and the plan-specific characteristics, and the variance of 
the parameters. We assume that consumers have the common discount factor as the 
monthly level of 0.99, instead of estimating β . We focus on the estimation of the first 
model with multiple switching possibilities. To begin with, the predicted aggregate 
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switching rate from n  to m  (10) was obtained by integrating the individual's predicted 
switching probability over the joint distribution of the random coefficients.  
Given the joint distribution of ( )f θ , D  random draws from ( )f θ  can be simulated to 
compute a consistent estimator of the integral. We assume that the parameters 
{ }( ), ,i i i im m Mcθ α γ ∈=  follow the normal distribution ( ),i Nθ θ Σ∼ . Then (10) can be 
computed using D  random draws dθ as  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )
ɵ ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1
exp1
exp
1
, ln exp
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θ δ θ δ θ
→
=
∈ −
= ∈ −
−
=
−
 
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 
∑
∑
∑ ∑
ɵ
 (1.18) 
    As discussed in the previous section, imth  is a switching participation probability that 
consumer i  decides to switch from m  to any other service provider, and a function 
of ( ), ln expimt ikt im
k M m
cδ δ
∈ −
 
− 
 
∑ . Since the value function of consumer i , (8) has two 
maximization problems in its own maximization function, imth is a complicated 
exponential function of logit inclusive values. We adopt a parametric assumption on 
imth  and estimate its parameters in the estimation process. Specifically, we impose a 
logistic approximation for the functional form of imth . Let ( )0 1 2, ,λ λ λ λ=  be a set of 
reduced-form parameters. 
 
ɵ
( )0 1 2
1
1 exp ln exp
imt
imt ikt im
k M m
h
cλ λ δ λ δ
∈ −
=
 
+ + + − 
 
∑
 (1.19) 
    We now mention two things about the parametric assumption. First, (19) is a 
reduced-form of the switching participation probability whose underlying parameters 
are ( ),i iθ Σ  of the model. This probability is the result of the consumer's dynamic 
optimization decision, so it may not have any closed-form solution. Second, the 
estimated parameters λ  cannot be used to simulate counterfactual scenarios since they 
are non-structural. But we can still derive the counterfactual equilibria using the 
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estimated structural parameters. For each simulated draw iθ , we can compute (3) 
directly and obtain the true switching participation rate of simulated consumer i . 
     Parameters ( ), ,θ λΣ  are estimated using the distributional assumption between the 
implied mean utilities with the instrument variables. To compute the implied mean 
utility, we utilize the fixed point algorithm as in Berry (1994) and BLP (1995). Define 
cm e
nt nt mu cδ = −  for n M m∈ − and f emt mtuδ = . Then we perform the following fixed point 
calculation on cmntδ  and fmtδ , where ( ),cm fm nt ms δ δ→ɵ  and ɵ ( ),q cm fmt mh δ δ is the predicted 
switching probability from m  to n  and the predicted quitting probability from m  
respectively, which can be calculated from (18). 
 
( ) ( )( ){ }
( ) ɵ ( )( ){ }
ln ln ,
ln ln ,
cm cm cm f
m ntnt nt m nt m
qf f q cm f
mtmt mt mt m
s s
h h
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
→→= + −
= + −
ɵ
 (1.20) 
    After obtaining a vector of the mean utilities, the moment condition can be formed by 
interacting the unobservable firm attributes ξ  with a set of relevant instruments z . 
Instrument variables may be correlated with the prices but supposed to be exogenous to 
the unobserved firm attributes. The instruments z  include the following variables: the 
monthly ARPU (Average Revenue per User), the advertising costs and the number of 
plans and plan families of other firms. The pricing and marketing structures of 
competing firms affect the firm’s own pricing strategy. However, the unobserved firm 
attributes are likely to be uncorrelated with them. Then GMM can be used to estimate 
the parameters from the predicted moments8.  
    Finally, we solve the individual dynamic optimization problem, conditional on a 
vector of ( ),cm fmδ δ  and the estimated parameters. We consider fully heterogeneous 
consumers in the model. Therefore, the expected Bellman equation, the logit inclusive 
values and the transition of industry evolution are different across every consumer. In 
order to obtain these values we draw iθ  from its distribution. And for each draw, we 
iteratively update the logit inclusive values (4), the expected evolution of logit inclusive 
values from (6), and the value function (7) until convergence. 
                                                
8
 Nevo (2000) 
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      The estimation of the one-time switching model needs only a slight extension of a 
multiple- switching model. The only difference is that we have two groups of 
individuals, which are consumers who already switched and consumers who have never 
switched. So it is required to compute the optimization problems separately for each 
group. We use the simulation technique to obtain the predicted firm specific switching 
probability (9). A parametric assumption is still imposed on switching participation rate 
b
imth  with parameters
bλ . Then fixed point calculation allows us to compute the groups 
of mean implied utilities. GMM is applied as in the multiple-switching model. In the 
final step, we update (13),(14) and (15) to complete solving for the optimization 
problems of consumers who have never switched. 
 
 
5. Data 
    We apply the model which was addressed earlier to the Korean cellular service 
market. It is one of the most developed telecommunication markets in the world. It has 
exhibited remarkable growth since 1990s. As a result of dramatic diffusion, cellular 
service penetration reached up to 80 percentage of the population in 2005. The market 
has begun to show evidence that it has reached a fully mature stage of development. The 
growth rate of new subscription has slowed down, and call related qualities of networks 
have been converging due to technological improvement. It makes maintaining current 
customers and stealing consumers from their competitors more important for the firms. 
We have observed that each firm keeps offering new calling options and improving 
customer benefits periodically. Table 1 presents the average features of plan across 
providers. 
    As number portability9 has been introduced in the cellular service market, the Korean 
government collects the number of switching consumers between networks every month. 
Three firms have been operating in the market during the sample period, which are SK, 
KT and LG in order of market share. Timing of the policy enforcement was sequential 
                                                
9
 Number portability is supposed to reduce switching costs by allowing consumers to keep their current 
phone number even after changing their service provider. Also the process of switching providers has 
been simplified. Many countries including Hong Kong, UK and USA have enforced number portability 
for their telecommunication market. 
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for the firms. It started from January 2004 for SK which is the first leading firm, July 
2004 for KT which is the second leading firm and January 2005 for LG whose market 
share is the lowest.  Figure 1, 2 and 3 show the switching rates of each firm after the 
enforcement of number portability. Switching rate of a firm is calculated as the ratio of 
the number of switchers from given firm at each month to the number of total 
consumers of the firm at the beginning of the month. .  
    We observe that firms have adjusted their menu of optional plans more actively by 
reducing prices, including more benefits (for example, more text messages or more free 
allowance) to the existing plans, or introducing new plans to the market during the 
sample period. Furthermore, considerable number of consumers switched their provider. 
In particular, we observe an interesting point in the evolution of switching rate. 
Switching rate tends to start at a high level, and drop fast. Then it again increases after 
experiencing a huge decrease.  
    Besides the monthly number of switchers, we utilize the following firm-level data; 
the monthly number of total subscribers, the monthly number of terminating consumers, 
the monthly number of new subscribers, the monthly ARPU and the quarterly 
advertising costs. Firms announce the updated information on their menu of optional 
plans whenever there are some changes, so the evolution of the menu of tariffs has been 
tracked.  
 
 
6. Results 
6.1 Estimated Parameters 
    The estimation results are shown in Table 1. The first column contains the parameter 
estimates from the consumer dynamic model which allows multiple-switching in 
Section 3.1. The second column provides the parameter estimates from the dynamic 
model where consumers are restricted to switch at most one time, which is addressed in 
Section 3.2.  
    First, consider the estimates from the dynamic model with repeated switching 
possibility. All of the mean plan specific characteristics have positive signs. More text 
messages and a higher level of customer benefits (the number of discounted lines and 
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the possibility of forwarding remained allowance to the next month) increase the utility 
of consumers. The mean coefficient of the total monthly payment is negative. In 
particular, the standard deviation level reveals that almost every consumer would be 
negatively affected by higher prices. As seen in Section 3.1, price coefficient α  also 
determines the optimal calling quantity in the usage decision given optional plan. A 
consumer with higherα  is likely to have smaller usage. There are considerable amounts 
of variation in consumer evaluation. But the utilities from calling service and the plan 
specifics turn out to be positive for most consumers. Overall, the estimated parameters 
show a reasonable sign and magnitude. The mean switching costs vary across firms and 
the differences are statistically significant. It implies that firms have different abilities to 
lock in their customers. 
    Reduced-form estimates of switching probability are also presented in the table. The 
probability that a consumer decides to switch from a specific firm is positively 
correlated with the inclusive values of its competitors including switching costs and is 
negatively correlated with its own inclusive value, as the signs of the coefficients imply. 
Higher inclusive value represents either more variety of plans or lower price. As 
competitors provide better menus of plans, it is likely for a firm to lose more consumers. 
Similarly, a firm can protect its customers from competitors by offering better plans or 
increasing product quality. Higher switching costs would discourage consumers from 
deciding to switch by decreasing the potential benefit from changing service providers. 
Figure 4 shows the switching probabilities of the mean consumer at the first period. 
Consumers with lower switching costs are more likely to switch their service provider 
than consumers with higher switching costs. The results imply that increasing its own 
switching costs can be one of a firm's strategies to retain customers. 
    Next, column 2 presents the estimates from the dynamic model with restricted 
switching. Signs of the plan specific characteristics vary. Some plan-specific 
characteristics have negative signs, but they are not statistically significant. The 
magnitudes of the estimates are generally similar to those of the dynamic model with 
multiple switching. No consistent change can be observed. The mean price coefficient is 
still negative and significant. Noticeable changes the multiple-switching model can be 
found in the estimates of the switching costs. The mean switching costs for every firm 
are lower than those for multiple-switching. Furthermore, they turn out to be 
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significantly different from the estimates in column 1. When the number of switching is 
restricted, consumers have to stay with the same provider after experiencing switch 
unless they stop using the cellular service and choose an outside option. It decreases the 
variety of choice for consumers, which would consequently reduce the option values. 
Then the switching costs estimates may get smaller in order to match the observed 
switching probabilities conditional on less option values. Therefore, restricting 
consumer switching to at most one time is likely to underestimate the switching costs.  
 
6.2 Additional results and Implications 
    We use the estimated parameters to investigate the dynamic features of consumer 
switching behavior and make predictions for switching decisions under different 
assumptions. As mentioned above, we cannot directly adopt the reduced-form 
parameters of switching participation rate for obtaining counterfactual equilibria. 
Instead, we solve the dynamic optimization problem for every simulated consumer 
using the estimated structural parameters. In this section, we present the application 
results for the SK which has the longest sample period.  
    First, we investigate variations in the switching rates under a counterfactual 
assumption on the fixed product evolution 10 . Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of 
switching rates when the variety of optional plans and plan characteristics including 
prices remain constant and consumers. We use the estimate results from the model 
where repeated switching is allowed. The dashed line is the path of the actual switching 
rates during our sample period that we observed11. The solid line shows the path of the 
simulated switching rate under the assumption on the same level of logit inclusive 
values for the firms would remain in the future. This figure shows that changes in the 
menu of plans and plan specific characteristics play an important role in switching 
decisions. The simulated switching rates would be higher than the observed rate at the 
beginning of our sample period. However, switching rate would decrease remarkably 
fast and appear to converge to zero by the end of our sample period. Variation in the 
                                                
10
 The evolution of products indicates the change in the plan characteristics and variety. 
11
 Observed switching rates are consistent with the switching rates which are generated by the estimated 
model since the model matches the estimated rate with the actual rate by the structure.   
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future inclusive values is the source of the option value from waiting. A stable future 
reduces the option values, so it accelerates early switching.  
    In order to understand the pattern of switching rates, we examine the average 
switching costs of switching consumers every period, and the difference in valuation of 
the firm which they switch from and the firm which they switch to. The results are 
illustrated in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Consumers who switch in earlier periods (first six 
months) have relatively lower switching costs. The average switching costs tend to 
increase.  Furthermore, the difference in switching consumers’ valuation for the firms is 
lower for the early switchers and increasing as the switching timing is delayed. Figure 8 
illustrates the time path of the logit values for all the firms in the market. We can 
observe the increase in consumers’ valuations. Remind that the number portability 
which can reduce switching costs has been enforced in the beginning of our sample 
period. These figures may suggest that remarkably high switching rates during the 
earlier periods are attributed to the consumers with relatively lower switching costs and 
that gradually increasing switching rates after those periods are due to the improvement 
of cellular services such as the introduction of more attractive plans or increase in the 
service quality.           
    Finally, we evaluate the ratio of repeated switching among the total switching rates. 
Figure 9 shows the simulation results of repeated switching ratio (dashed line) among 
the total switching rates (solid line). We find that repeated switching explains a very 
small fraction of the total switching rates. It implies that the duration of subscription 
tend to be more than 2 years for most consumers. Even though the multiple switching 
rates are relatively low, it is noticeable that the ratio appears to increase near the end of 
the sample period. 
 
 
6.3. Fit of the model 
    In the process of our estimation, we impose some parametric specifications on the 
expected inclusive values and the switching probability for each firm. Consumer i 's 
logit inclusive value of firm m  at time 1t + , 1imtδ +  is assumed to depend on a vector of 
the logit inclusive values at time t , itδ . The logit approximation is applied to 
 25 
consumer i 's switching probability from m  at time t , imth  that is determined by its own 
switching costs and the inclusive values itδ . The validity of these assumptions is 
examined in the following figures. 
    We use estimation results from the first dynamic model where repeated switching is 
allowed. First, Figure 10 provides the observed and the 95% interval of the predicted 
logit inclusive values for the mean consumer over time. We perform the same process 
for the switching probability of the mean consumer and the results are given in Figure 
11. The model fits quite well for both cases. 
 
 
   
7. Conclusion 
    This paper investigates the dynamics of consumer's optimal timing decision to switch 
providers across differentiated networks in the cellular service industry. It develops a 
structural model that accounts for consumer heterogeneity, the sequential choices 
resulting from the characteristics of pricing scheme, and the existence of switching costs. 
Consumers are allowed to switch repeatedly upon their prediction for the future as the 
market features change. We use a monthly data set on the number of consumers who 
switch their provider, firm attributes and plan specific characteristics. Number 
portability has been enforced during the sample period. 
    The estimation is basically in the range of the BLP-style technique. But the difference 
in our model is that we adopt a nested estimation method. Reduced-form specifications 
are imposed on the expectation of the market evolution process, and the switching 
participation rate which is a result of individual dynamic optimization problem. These 
parameters are estimated within the structural estimation algorithm. We examine the 
two dynamic models, the one which allows multiple-switching and the other which 
allows one-time switching only. Two dynamic models generate sensible estimates. 
However, the dynamic model with restricted number of switching is likely to 
underestimate the magnitude of the switching costs. We find that consumers differ 
substantially in their preferences and switching costs. Consumers with lower switching 
costs are likely to decide to switch their service provider earlier. Switching decision is 
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affected by improvement in product quality and price as well as the switching costs. 
Increase in consumers’ valuation can encourage consumers to decide to switch by 
making it more likely for benefits from switching to exceed switching costs. 
    This paper focuses on the demand side, taking the plan changes and firm behaviors as 
exogenous. A more comprehensive work in the future will involve the research in the 
supply side which endogenizes firms' pricing and product entry decisions. Since most 
network industries provide non-linear pricing schemes, the supply side of the cellular 
service industry would have important implications. 
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Appendix A: The distribution of imtϕ  
 
The same proof is contained in Melnikov (2001) and Carranza (2005).  
Let ( )( )1 1max |m m
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 = + + Ω Ω  is the maximum attainable utility 
that consumer i  get from firm m  at time t .  
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The cumulative distribution of imtϕ  is given by, 
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the mode imtδ . 
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Appendix B: The switching participation rate imth  
 
Using the result from the appendix A, we can derive a functional form of the switching 
participation rate imth  that consumer i  decides to switch from firm m to any other 
provider at time t . For k M m∈ −  
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Now, the switching participation rate is, 
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The density function of imtϕ , ( )imtf ϕ is a function of m ’s logit inclusive value imtδ as 
shown in Appendix A. Therefore, consumer i ’s switching participation rate from m  at 
time t  depends on the logit inclusive value of all the firms, and finally its own 
switching costs imc . 
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Table1. Average plan features across service providers 
 November 2003 May 2006 
Number of plan families 4.33 7 
Number of plans 32 44.33 
Monthly fee of basic plan 15.58 (2006 US $)* 13.12 (2006 US $) 
Calling fee of basic plan 0.022 (2006 US $) 0.019 (2006 US $) 
* Won, Currency unit of Korea is converted to the US dollar after adjusting the price change.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure1. Switching rates of SK 
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Figure2. Switching rates of KT 
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Figure3. Switching rates of LG 
Jan 05 Jun 05 Dec 05 Jun 06
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
sw
itc
hi
n
g 
ra
te
(%
)
 
 
 
 34 
 
Table2. Estimation results 
Parameter Dynamic model with 
Multiple-switching 
Dynamic model with 
Restricted switching 
α  -0.035(0.0062)* -0.022(0.0093)* 
γ -number of txt 0.196(0.0034)* -0.025(0.011)* 
γ -forward allowance 0.359(0.021)* 0.507(0.095) 
γ -number of discounted lines 0.151(0.083) 0.162(0.027)* 
SKc  4.029(0.712)* 1.171(1.015)* 
KTc  3.291(0.463)* 1.625(0.163)* 
LGc  2.778(1.408) 1.008(4.808) 
0λ  5.443(2.005)* 3.003(2.150) 
1λ  0.208(0.078)* 0.420(0.065)* 
2λ  -0.338(0.076)* -0.915(0.115)* 
ασ  0.0108(0.0024)* 0.0123(0.0057)* 
γσ  0.0672(0.0105)* 0.0831(0.0559) 
cσ  1.487(0.393)* 0.623(0.0554)* 
1) Standard errors in parenthesis; 2) * significant at 5% level 
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Figure4. Variation in switching probability 
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Figure5. Switching rates under the fixed product evolution 
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Figure6. Average switching costs of switching customers 
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Figure7. Difference in valuation for firms of switching consumers (average) 
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Figure8. Evolution of logit inclusive value 
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Figure9. Share of repeated switching 
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Figure10. 95% interval of logit inclusive value 
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Figure11. 95% interval of switching participation probability 
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